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C
RISIS anniversaries are usually oc-
casions to draw lessons from the 
past—and the 10th anniversary of 
the Asian financial crisis last year 
was no different. Numerous conferences ana-
lyzed events of a decade earlier and studied 
ways to prevent a similar crisis.
But the conferences had barely ended when 
a new crisis erupted. The epicenter of the cri-
sis had changed—from Asia to the United 
States and Europe. And the buzzwords had, 
too. Securitization, subprime mortgages, 
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
seem radically different from the currency 
pegs, excessive corporate borrowing, and 
foreign debt that dominated the Asian finan-
cial crisis. But the underlying causes of both 
episodes are similar. Each was triggered by 
investor panic in the face of uncertainty over 
the security and valuation of assets, and each 
featured a liquidity run and rising insolvency 
in the banking system.
How can policymakers better identify pre-
crisis warning signals? And how can they 
pinpoint the recurring problems that, if tack-
led during tranquil times, could mitigate the 
risk and cushion the impact of future crises? 
This article explores the subprime and Asian 
crises to see what lessons can be learned and 
discusses the factors behind Asia’s resilience, 
thus far, to the current crisis.
early warning signals
A common backdrop to both crises was abun-
dant liquidity and excessive, imprudent credit 
expansion. Prior to the Asian crisis, capital 
flows into the region surged (see Chart 1), 
leading to a sharp rise in bank lending and 
corporate borrowings. Foreign investors 
bought high-yielding Asian securities or U.S. 
dollar–denominated debt instruments as-
suming that Asian economies would contin-
ue to grow rapidly and currency pegs would 
hold indefinitely. Similarly, the current crisis 
was preceded by massive flows of capital into 
the United States to finance its current ac-
count deficits. That abundant liquidity was 
intermediated by financial institutions into 
consumer credit and mortgages, which were 
converted into mortgage-backed securities 
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(MBSs) and CDOs. The search for yield fueled demand for 
these structured products by investors, many of whom based 
their decisions solely on the strength of the AAA ratings af-
forded by credit rating agencies.
There was also a search for yield by lenders, and the abun-
dance of liquidity tended to lead to lax credit standards. In 
the Asian financial crisis, credit imprudence came in the form 
of connected lending to large corporate entities or to mega-
projects and property developments that were of dubious 
commercial viability. In the subprime crisis, that search led to 
the proliferation of mortgage loans in the subprime category, 
the so-called ninja (no income, no job, and no assets) loans.
Another sign of trouble prior to both crises was the rapid 
increases in property asset prices. U.S. property prices, for 
instance, rose 50 percent between 2001 and 2006. Indeed, 
such asset bubbles have been linked in past crises to the 
availability of easy credit. According to Minsky’s well-
known financial instability hypothesis (1992), a period of 
strong growth encourages increased leveraging. Minsky 
classified borrowers into three types, in declining order of 
their ability to make interest and principal payments: hedge 
borrowers, which can pay their obligations from cash flow; 
speculative borrowers, which can pay only the interest but 
need to roll over the principal; and Ponzi borrowers, which 
can pay neither interest nor principal and must borrow, 
or sell assets, just to meet their interest bill. The growth of 
speculative and Ponzi borrowers leads first to an asset bub-
ble and then to the widespread realization that the increased 
lending is unsustainable. The result is a sudden pullback in 
financing and a crash.
Such financial instability is apparent in both crises. 
Subprime mortgage growth, representing speculative and 
Ponzi borrowing, could have trapped the United States in a 
superficially virtuous but insidiously vicious housing price 
cycle. While house prices were rising, creditors felt safe lend-
ing on appreciating collateral, which in turn fed housing 
demand and prices. Similarly, lending to corporate entities 
in Asia was spurred by booming economies and easy credit, 
with many loans ending up in unprofitable projects, sus-
tained only by further debt infusions. Both of these unsus-
tainable cycles were destined to unravel (see Chart 2).
Asset market bubbles are notoriously hard to pin down 
while they are happening. It is also difficult to judge the 
point at which credit growth changes from being good to 
being excessive. Nevertheless, the two crises seem to suggest 
that prolonged upswings in asset (especially property) prices 
and rapid credit growth should trigger enhanced surveillance 
efforts, as well as a search for possible market distortions.
recurring problems
Alongside common symptoms, the subprime crisis and the 
Asian crisis exhibited common problems, which could be 
viewed as underlying illnesses.
To begin with, the credit imprudence shown by lenders 
in both crises reflected the classic principal-agent problem. 
During the Asian financial crisis, shareholders’ interests were 
ignored by bank managers, who lent indiscriminately to cer-
tain companies and projects, either at the behest of govern-
ments or because these projects were related to influential 
shareholders. In the subprime crisis, CDO and MBS investors 
expected mortgage lenders to maintain credit standards. But 
with the “originate and distribute” model, lenders had little 
incentive to worry about credit standards because they did 
not retain the loans. Instead, mortgage lenders made loans 
that they immediately sold to banks, which in turn packaged 
them as securities. Lenders were seeking to maximize the fee 
income from securitization rather than the interest income 
from loans. With little or no ownership of the underlying 
loans, credit standards dropped sharply, leading to higher 
default rates when the property market turned down.
There were also classic cases of moral hazard, because lend-
ers and borrowers faced little if any risk from their activities. 
Some of the precrisis Asian banking systems and megaproj-
ects appeared to enjoy de facto bailout guarantees from their 
governments (Krugman, 1998), encouraging the banks to 
lend without regard for the commercial viability of the proj-
ects. Similarly, many banks and corporate entities borrowed 
in foreign currency at lower interest rates, on the assumption 
that the pegged exchange rates would be maintained indefi-
nitely. In the current crisis, investors and banks invested in 
long-duration, complex structured financial products such as 
MBSs and CDOs using short-term funds, on the assumption 
that access to rollover funding would always be available in 
the highly liquid interbank and money markets because cen-
tral banks can inject liquidity if necessary.
The recurring problems of agency and moral hazard 
in all crises may be an indication that they are systemic. 
Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of policymakers to design 
systems and policies that minimize such risks and mitigate 
their impact.
Different policy responses
Although the subprime crisis is unfolding, it has moved into 
the phase of management and resolution. What is striking is 
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Chart 1
Surging capital
In the two years before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, capital 
flows into the area increased dramatically.
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Sources: CEIC; and IMF, International Financial Statistics.
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how different the policy response is now from the one of a 
decade ago.
In the subprime crisis, major central banks have intervened 
aggressively to provide liquidity to contain disruptions and 
contagion in financial markets. At the same time, the U.S. 
Federal Reserve has cut interest rates substantially to ease 
monetary conditions, and the U.S. Congress has approved a 
fiscal stimulus package. In the Asian crisis, monetary and fis-
cal policies were initially tightened to support exchange rates 
because of massive capital outflows and a run on foreign 
reserves, which contributed to a downward spiral in the real 
economy. Only after exchange rates had stabilized at a lower 
level did governments adopt more expansionary fiscal poli-
cies to support the real economies.
There has also been a major difference in public versus 
private recapitalization of banks, at least in the initial phase 
of the crisis resolution. During the Asian crisis, many gov-
ernments took over nonperforming loans and injected new 
capital into the banks, while the IMF topped up the depleted 
foreign reserves of the central banks. Only at a later stage were 
there substantial injections of private capital in the form of 
foreign buyouts of local banks. In the current crisis, the main 
recapitalization of banks has come through direct placements 
or through capital injections by sovereign wealth funds. Two 
notable exceptions were Northern Rock, which was nation-
alized by the U.K. government, and the Bear Stearns rescue, 
which exposed the U.S. Federal Reserve to potential losses 
from Bear Stearns’ impaired assets. However, if the subprime 
crisis worsens, governments will likely be forced to take a 
greater and more direct role in stabilizing the economy and 
the banking system.
learning from asia
But there are two key steps in which the industrial economies 
should emulate Asia in its recovery from its financial crisis. 
The first is the reduction of leverage for the class of borrowers 
whose problems were painfully exposed by the crisis. In the 
Asian crisis, those borrowers were the corporate entities and 
banks that were both overleveraged and overreliant on for-
eign debt. The subprime equivalents are
• the U.S. household sector, in which debt to disposable 
income has risen from about 80 percent in 1990 to about 
140 percent, and in which many borrowers took on loans 
with low initial interest rates and high reset rates;
• the banks that had engaged in off-balance-sheet invest-
ments and are forced to bring those vehicles onto their bal-
ance sheets;
• the investment banks, which engaged in highly leveraged 
broker-dealer transactions on a narrow capital base; and
• the hedge funds and other investment companies that 
had taken advantage of easy money to borrow aggressively.
Reducing leverage will be more perilous this time because 
hedge funds and banks are more closely linked. For instance, 
prime brokerage has become a bigger proportion of invest-
ment banking income, while several large hedge funds are 
owned by banks themselves. Clearly, supervisors and regula-
tors must be more vigilant in detecting 
and limiting excessive risk taking, espe-
cially the rapid and sustained buildup 
of leverage by nonregulated entities. The 
registration, licensing, and gathering of 
relevant information from such entities 
should be improved.
The second key action worth emula-
tion is the correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances. The current economic slow-
down and depreciation of the U.S. dol-
lar are likely to lead to a slowdown or a 
reduction in consumption and housing 
investment, a rise in the household sav-
ing rate, and a narrowing of the current 
account deficit. This is similar to what 
happened in many Asian countries, 
except that it was property and other 
investment spending that had to be cut 
sharply.
so far, so good for asia . . .
To be sure, Asia is not immune to the cur-
rent crisis. Asian equity markets have sold 
off across the region, and volatility has 
increased markedly while credit spreads 
have widened. Furthermore, growth in the 
Asian economies is likely to be trimmed 
by the downturn in the U.S. economy. 
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Parallel paths
The 1997 Asian crisis and the current subprime crisis followed similar courses.
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Nevertheless, economic growth in Asia has held up well 
despite the financial market turbulence and weakness in 
exports. One reason is that macroeconomic fundamentals are 
much healthier than they were 10 years ago—as reflected in 
the improved sovereign credit ratings of the countries. Asian 
countries have cut back domestic spending, reduced fiscal defi-
cits, and reformed their economies. Spending on megaprojects 
and property developments is no longer excessive, resulting in 
more balanced and efficient economies. The development of 
local-currency financial instruments has helped to reduce the 
currency mismatches that underlay the Asian financial crisis. 
Central banks have also improved their management of capital 
flows, mitigating the risk of exchange rate overvaluation, credit 
booms, and asset bubbles.
Another reason is that corporate balance sheets in Asia have 
improved as debt-to-equity ratios have been reduced sharply 
and foreign currency borrowing is no longer a large compo-
nent of the corporate sources of funding in most countries 
(see Chart 3).
Asia’s relative resilience to the subprime crisis has also 
highlighted the progress it has made in reforming its bank-
ing systems. The limited exposures of Asian banks to sub-
prime and CDO assets, coupled with well-capitalized balance 
sheets, have allowed Asian interbank markets to remain calm 
while the interbank markets in the United States and Europe 
have been in chaos. Generally, low loan-to-deposit ratios (see 
Chart 4), together with little off-balance-sheet financing, 
have helped banks avoid liquidity and funding stress in the 
current credit turmoil.
Moreover, most Asian countries have strengthened their 
external positions: they are running current account sur-
pluses, maintaining large foreign reserves, and diversifying 
exports. Reflecting the strong external positions, selling pres-
sures on Asian currencies remained muted despite significant 
portfolio outflows from Asian markets and the unwinding of 
carry trades that occurred during the subprime crisis. Most 
Asian currencies have strengthened during 2007 and into 
2008, aiding their economies in heading off inflationary pres-
sures, especially from high commodity prices.
A final strength of most Asian economies has been the rela-
tively modest property price appreciation compared with that 
in the United States and certain European countries, such as 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain (see Chart 5). Asian 
countries, including Singapore, have taken measures to cool 
property markets in recent years whenever prices threatened 
to become a bubble. As a result, property price crashes in the 
wake of slowing economic growth and financial market tur-
moil have been less of a risk.
. . . but it still faces risks
Even so, Asian policymakers must watch for remaining risks 
from the subprime crisis that could pose problems for Asia. 
These include what a Standard & Poor’s report called a possible 
“triple whammy” on banks: more subprime-related losses, an 
adverse impact on Asian financial markets that affects banks, 
and an adverse impact on Asian economies that affects banks.
But to date, such impacts seem muted. Asian banks are 
engaged in traditional bank lending and are not heavily 
exposed to the more sophisticated types of financial products 
that have hurt financial sectors in many industrial countries. 
However, a decline in the real economy as a result of eco-
nomic declines in the United States and Europe could cause a 
significant deterioration in the quality of bank loans.
Thus far, Asian economies have coped well with the U.S. 
economic slowdown and financial turmoil. Most analysts 
project only a mild slowdown in GDP growth across the 
region. However, Asian economies are likely to be more 
adversely affected by a severe downturn in the U.S. economy, 
which could result in distressed loans and trigger a negative 
credit cycle.
Over a longer horizon, once confidence returns to capital 
markets, capital flows into emerging Asia could be a source 
of vulnerability. Capital inflows could return in even larger 
volumes than before, especially if Asia is perceived as a “safe 
haven.” Capital inflows can make a positive contribution to 
the economy and financial markets, but they can be vola-
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Chart 4
Banks are stronger
Generally, low loan-to-deposit ratios have helped Asian banks 
avoid liquidity and funding stress in the current turmoil.
(loans to deposits, percent)
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Chart 3
Improving balance sheets
Corporate debt-to-equity ratios have improved dramatically in 
many Asian countries since the 1997 financial crisis.
(debt to equity, percent)
Source: Thomson International.
Author: Khor, 4/21/08
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tile and must be carefully managed to mitigate their adverse 
impact on the real economies.
subprime lessons for asia
Asian economies can learn several lessons from the subprime 
crisis. First, whereas the form of crises may change, their essence 
stays the same. Asia should watch for the common early warn-
ing signs: abundant liquidity, rapid credit growth, and sustained 
asset price inflation. This is of particular importance to emerg-
ing Asia, where capital flows have amplified the challenges of 
managing liquidity and credit growth and volatility in asset 
markets. Policymakers and regulators should also be mindful 
of the classic behavioral problems of principal-agent and moral 
hazard that are sometimes the unwitting by-products of policies 
or measures that are well intended. Central banks and regulators 
also need to enhance their macroprudential tool kits to under-
stand and address the recurring problems of liquidity, leverage, 
and contagion in today’s globalized financial system. Although 
it might be impossible to predict where and when the next crisis 
will surface, the onus is on policymakers to mitigate the risk.
Second, Asia needs to find the right balance between progress 
and prudence, innovation, and caution. An overemphasis on 
progress over prudence might have been one of the contribut-
ing factors to the subprime crisis. In an article in the Korean 
Herald last year on the need for financial cooperation in Asia, 
economist Barry Eichengreen suggested that the U.S. authori-
ties had reduced the regulatory burden in response to compe-
tition from London as a financial center. Wave after competing 
wave of deregulation is a trap that emerging Asia must avoid.
A case in point was the rapid collapse of Bear Stearns and 
Northern Rock. The former was at the forefront of financial 
innovation in securities markets, and the latter was lauded 
for its innovative funding strategy. Asia should be careful to 
ensure that any move away from traditional banking prac-
tices toward more innovative techniques is accompanied by 
enhanced management of liquidity risk.
To be sure, Asia should continue to develop its capital 
markets and encourage the growth of its financial institu-
tions as part of its broader economic and financial develop-
ment. However, the subprime crisis has shown that financial 
innovations—whether new products, new structures, or new 
market players—do not come without risks. As Asian finan-
cial markets expand into new terrain, policymakers must put 
measures in place to deal with the risks posed by financial 
innovation.
In trying to balance innovation and caution, policymakers 
might be aided by a few key principles:
• Credit standards must be maintained at all times	 but 
especially in times of abundant liquidity and strong eco-
nomic growth. Easy credit usually reflects underlying prob-
lems of principal-agent and moral hazard and is ultimately a 
cause of financial instability.
• Transparency is critical for financial supervision and 
market discipline to be effective. The subprime crisis has 
shown that ordinary loans can become a major source of risk 
and uncertainty when securitized into complex, nontranspar-
ent structured financial products, and when held in varying 
concentrations by any number of potential investors, includ-
ing banks’ off-balance-sheet investment vehicles. Regulators 
should ensure that comprehensive information on new prod-
ucts and entities is readily available to allow supervisors and 
market analysts to understand and monitor the incremental 
risks to the financial system.
• Financial linkages must be understood. The subprime 
crisis and credit turmoil illustrate the increasing complex-
ity and connectivity of financial markets and products. 
Policymakers and regulators should ensure that sufficient 
resources are devoted to financial surveillance, supervision, 
and risk management to mitigate the risks engendered by 
innovations and developments in financial markets.
A third lesson is that economic fundamentals are essential. 
Weak economic fundamentals, such as highly leveraged cor-
porate balance sheets and large current account deficits, led to 
a loss of confidence in 1997. Strong economic fundamentals 
in 2007–08 have enabled Asia to remain relatively resilient in 
the current turmoil. This should encourage emerging mar-
ket economies to maintain strong balance sheets, sustainable 
current account balances, and enough foreign reserves to act 
as a buffer against shocks.
Asia’s healthy long-term growth prospects should mean 
that the region is poised to ride, or even lead, the next eco-
nomic boom. The challenge is to ensure that its development 
does not get derailed by financial land mines along the way. 
The region should exploit its firmer footing to build on the 
lessons of the 1997 and current crises.  n
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Chart 5
No property bubble
Unlike in the United States and many European countries, 
property price appreciation in Asia has been modest.
(property price indices; year-to-year growth, percent)
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